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 
Abstract—With increasing reliance on Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices and services, the capability to detect intrusions and 
malicious activities within IoT networks is critical for resilience 
of the network infrastructure. In this paper, we present a novel 
model for intrusion detection based on two-layer dimension 
reduction and two-tier classification module, designed to detect 
malicious activities such as User to Root (U2R) and Remote to 
Local (R2L) attacks.  The proposed model is using component 
analysis and linear discriminate analysis of dimension reduction 
module to spate the high dimensional dataset to a lower one with 
lesser features. We then apply a two-tier classification module 
utilizing Naïve Bayes and Certainty Factor version of K-Nearest 
Neighbor to identify suspicious behaviors. The experiment results 
using NSL-KDD dataset shows that our model outperforms 
previous models designed to detect U2R and R2L attacks. 
 
Index Terms— Anomaly Detection, CF-KNN, Intrusion Detection 
System, IoT, Multi-layer Classification 
I. INTRODUCTION 
nternet of Things (IoT) technologies are becoming 
increasingly    prevalent across different industry sectors 
such as  health care, personal and social domains, and smart 
cities [1]. Similar to most consumer technologies, IoT 
technologies are not designed with security in mind, which are 
now emerging as a key barrier in the wider adoption of IoT 
networks and services [2]. Intrusion detection is one of several 
security mechanisms for managing security intrusions [3], 
which can be detected in any of four layers of IoT architecture 
shown in Figure 1 [4]. The Network layer not only serves as a 
backbone for connecting different IoT devices, but also 
provides opportunities for deploying network-based security 
defense mechanisms such as Network Intrusion Detection 
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Systems (NIDS) [5],[6],[7]. According to the analysis of 
KDD99 [3] and its latter version NSL-KDD [9], malicious 
behaviors (attacks) in network-based intrusions can be 
classified into the following four main categories [7]: 
 Probe: when an attacker seeks to only gain information 
about the target network through network and host 
scanning activities (i.e. ports scanning). 
 DoS (denial of service): when an attacker interrupts 
legitimate users’ access to the given service or 
machine. 
 U2R (User to Root): when an attacker attempts to 
escalate a limited user’ privilege to a super user or root 
access (e.g. via malware infection or stolen 
credentials). 
 R2L (Remote to Local): when an attacker gains remote 
access to a victim machine imitating existing local 
users. 
User to Root (U2R) and Remote to Local (R2L) attacks are 
among the most challenging attacks to detect as they mimick 
normal users behavior [10] [11].  
IDS are categorized into signature-based and anomaly-
based detection based on their technique in detecting an 
intrusion [12]. Signature-based IDS relies on a set of pre-
defined malicious activates patterns and  attack signatures to 
detect intrusions while anomaly-based IDS relies on 
deviations from normal behaviors to detect intrusions [6]. 
Signature-based IDSes generally outperform anomaly-based 
IDSes in detecting previously known attacks, but the former is 
ineffective against unknown or polymorphic attacks [13]. On 
the other hand, anomaly-based IDSes are capable of detecting 
unknown attacks in the absence of a predefined pattern. Due to 
the diversity of devices deployed in IoT networks, it would be 
unrealistic and impractical to rely on pre-defined attack 
patterns for intrusion detection, which limits signature-based 
IDS utilization in IoT networks [14]. 
In this paper, we present a network anomaly-based model 
for intrusion detection, hereafter referred to as Two-layer 
Dimension Reduction and Two-tier Classification (TDTC) 
model.
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Fig 1.  IoT Network Security Architecture [4] 
The proposed model, designed for anomaly-based intrusion 
detection in IoT backbone networks, uses two-layer dimension 
reduction and two-tier classification detection techniques to 
detect “hard-to-detect” intrusions, such as U2R and R2L 
attacks. We also demonstrate that the proposed model has the 
following characteristics: 
 Higher overall detection rates due to the deployment 
of a multi-layer classifier 
 Lower false positive due to deployment of a 
refinement feature 
 Accurate detection of U2R and R2L attacks, without 
reducing performance 
 Lower computational complexity due to deployment 
of dimension reduction in the two layers. 
In the next section, we present related work. The proposed 
model is presented in Section 3, and evaluation of the model is 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper and 
outlines future research topics. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Existing intrusion detection and prevention models generally 
use statistical approaches [15] such as Hidden Markov Model 
(HMM) [15], Bayes theory [16], cluster analysis [17], signal 
processing [18] and distance measuring [19] to detect 
anomalous activities. Anomaly detection approaches can be 
broadly categorized into supervised and unsupervised learning 
[6]. In supervised anomaly detection approach, normal 
behavior of a system or networks is constructed using a 
labeled dataset [20]. Unsupervised technique assumes that 
normal behaviors are more frequent and, thus, the model is 
built based on this assumption; thus, no training data is 
required [21].  
Casas et al. [22] proposed an unsupervised NIDS based on 
subspace clustering and outlier detection and demonstrated 
that their approach performs well against unknown attacks. In 
[23], a feature section filter module is proposed, which utilizes 
Principal Component Analysis and Fisher Dimension 
Reduction to filter noises. In the approach, Self-Organizing 
Maps (SOMs) neural model is also used to filter out normal 
activities. However, this approach has a high false positive 
rate. Bostani and Sheikhan [24] proposed an unsupervised 
framework based on Optimum-path forest algorithm and K-
Means clustering technique. This framework models malicious 
and normal behavior of networks.  
The supervised anomaly detection approach in [25] 
leverages both distance measure and density of clusters for 
intrusion detection. Zhaung et al [26] proposed a model based 
on random forest algorithm to discover anomaly patterns with 
a high accuracy yet low false negative rate.  
Guo et al. [27] proposed a two-level intrusion detection 
approach which first detects misuse and then uses KNN 
algorithm to reduce false alarms. Toosi et al. [28] proposed a 
multi attack classifier model, which implements a mix of 
fuzzy neural network, fuzzy inference approach, and genetic 
algorithms for intrusion detection. Despite a high accuracy 
rate in identifying normal behaviors and detecting simpler 
attacks such as DoS attacks and probe, the model performs 
poorly in detecting low frequency and distribution attacks 
such as R2L.  Horng et al [29] proposed a multi-classification 
attack model consisting of support vector machines (SVM) 
and BRICH hierarchical clustering technique to extract 
significant attributes from KDD99 dataset. Their proposed 
model has a high detection rate for DoS and Porbe attacks, but 
is ineffective against U2R and R2L attacks.  
Tan et al. [30] proposed a system for DoS detection using 
multivariate correlation analysis (MCA) to improve the 
accuracy of network traffic characterization. In [31], a two-
layer classification module was used to detect U2R and R2L 
attacks with low computational complexity due to its 
optimized feature reduction. Osanaiye et al. [13] proposed an 
ensemble-based multi-filter feature selection method to detect 
distributed DoS attacks in cloud environments using four filter 
methods to achieve an optimum selection over NSL-KDD 
dataset. Iqbal et al. [32] presented an attack taxonomy for 
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cloud services and suggested a cloud-based intrusion detection 
system.  
Ambusaidi et al. in [33] proposed a mutual information 
based IDS that selects optimal feature for classification based 
on feature selection algorithm. Their approach was evaluated 
using three benchmark data set (KDD Cup 99, NSL-KDD and 
Kyoto 2006+). 
Intrusion detection systems have also been used for 
managing security risks in industrial control systems [14].  For 
example, Pan et al. [34] proposed  a systematic and automated 
approach to build a hybrid IDS that learns temporal state-
based specifications for electric power systems to accurately 
differentiate between disturbances, normal control operations, 
and cyber-attacks. Zhou et al. [35] presented an industrial 
anomaly and multi model driven IDS based on Hidden 
Markov Model to filter attacks from actual faults.  
Security issues can be a barrier to widespread adoption of 
IoT devices [36]. Whitmore et al., [37] showed that wide 
range of techniques could mitigate cyber threat targeting IoT 
systems. Ning et al. [38] proposed a hierarchical 
authentication architecture to provide anonymous data 
transmission in IoT networks.  Cao et al. [39] highlighted the 
impact and importance of ghost attacks on ZigBee based IoT 
devices. Chen et al. [40] proposed an autonomic model-driven 
cyber security management approach for IoT systems, which 
can be used to estimate, detect, and respond to cyberattacks 
with little or no human intervention. Teixeira et al. [41] 
proposed a scheme for thwarting insiders attacks in IoT 
networks by crosschecking data transformation of every IoT 
node.  
III. PROPOSED TDTC MODEL 
The proposed model comprises a dimension reduction module 
and a classification module, to be discussed in sections III.A 
and III.B, respectively. 
 
 
Fig 2. In PCA, linear transformation is used to reduce high dimension dataset 
to a low dimension dataset  
A. Dimension Reduction Module 
The dimension reduction module is deployed to address 
limitations due to dimensionality that may lead to making 
wrong decisions while increasing computational complexity of 
the classifier. We deployed both Linear Discriminant Analysis 
(LDA) (i.e. a supervised dimension reduction technique) and 
Principal Component Analysis (i.e. an unsupervised 
dimension reduction technique) in order to address the high 
dimensionality issue. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
can be used to perform feature selection and extraction [42]:   
a) Feature selection: choose a subset of all features based 
on their effectiveness in higher classification (i.e. 
choosing more informative features)  
b) Feature extraction: create a subset of new features by 
combining existing features. 
In TDTC, we used PCA as a feature extraction mechanism to 
map the NSL-KDD dataset, which consists of 41 features to 
one with a lower feature space by removing less significant 
features. Feature extraction technique is commonly limited to 
linear transforms: y = Wx as shown in in Figure 2.  
Let X be an N-dimensional random vector in the original 
dataset, and the new feature space consists of lower M-
dimensions (M is the number of new dataset features that are 
transformed) where (𝑀 < 𝑁). For the transformation 
operation, we will need to compute Eq. 1 to Eq.3: 
 
Covariance matrix:  
∑ = ∑ (𝑥𝑘 − 𝑚)(𝑥𝑘 − 𝑚)
𝑇𝑛
𝑘=1𝑥 ,      (Eq.1) 
 
Where m (mean vector) is: 
𝑚 =  
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑥𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1          (Eq.2) 
 
Eigenvector-eigenvalue decomposition:   
 
Σv = λv   Where v=Eigenvector λ=Eigenvalue (Eq.3) 
 
PCA will then sort the eigenvectors in descending order. In 
other words, eigenvectors with lower eigenvalues have the 
least information about the distribution of the data and these 
are the eigenvectors we wish to drop. A common approach is 
to rank the eigenvectors from the highest to the lowest 
eigenvalue and choose the top 𝒌 eigenvectors based on 
eigenvalues. Similarly, in TDTC, one may decide which 
eigenvalues are more useful; thus, the ideal feature mapping 
matrix 𝑊 can be concluded and used for linear transformation 
of training and test dataset.  
At this layer of dimension reduction, Imbedded Error 
Function (IEF) factor analysis measure [43] is used to select 
the  principal [44] as shown in Eq.4, where l, m denotes the 
number of Principal Components (PCs). Both l and m are used 
to represent the data and number of dimension, respectively. N 
and 𝜆 denote the number of samples and Eigenvalues, 
respectively.  
 
IEF(l) =  [
𝑙 ∑ 𝜆𝑚𝑗=𝐼+1
𝑁𝑚(𝑚−𝑙)
]
1
2⁄
       (E q.4) 
 
Cross Validation (CV) is used to evaluate optimum principals 
with minimum errors as shown in Figure 3. Applying selection 
criteria would reduce some features and help the next layer of 
dimension reduction module to compute lower dimension 
matrix and spreadable objects. 
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Fig 5. Imbedded Error Function measure of NSL-KDD train 
data set to select optimum number of dimension with minimum 
error and information loss. 
 
As observed in Figure 5, Cumulative Percent Variance (CPV) 
measure with 95% threshold is also examined to justify the 
selection of optimum dimensions.  
CPV(𝑙) = 100 [
∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑙
𝑗=1 
∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
] %        (Eq.5) 
B. Linear Discriminant Analysis  
Linear computation can be used to achieve a reasonable speed 
in intrusion detection systems [31].  
Since objects (samples) in the PCA-transformed dataset are 
not ideal for classification, the proposed model utilized 
another feature reduction module to apply the labeled data in 
an optimal transformation to new dimensions. LDA examines 
the class labels to reduce the dimension of large working 
datasets and LDA is widely used in different domains such as 
image processing and stock analysis [45]. LDA chooses an 
After the transformation using LDA, the new mapped features 
will have only four dimensions {lda1, ..., lda4}.  
Figure 4 shows the two-dimension of the newly mapped 
original data set transformed by LDA. In other words, the 
dataset has been converted into 𝐶 − 1 dimensions, where C is 
number of class labels that exist in the original dataset. 
optimal projection matrix to map a higher dimensional feature 
space to a new lower dimensional space while preserving the 
required information for data classification [46].  
 
There are two scatter matrices that need to be obtained in 
LDA, namely: SB which is the between-class scatter matrix, 
and SW the within-class scatter matrix. In TDTC, the LDA 
dimension reduction module transforms the NSL-KDD dataset 
to a lower dimension. It is assumed that there is a set of n d-
dimensional vectors of xi, ..., xn belonging to k different class 
labels of Ci, where each i = 1, 2, 3,...,k has ni samples (in 
TDTC k = 5 e.g. normal, DoS, Probe, U2R, L2R).  
The projection matrix 𝑊 is calculated to maximize SB – see 
Eq. 6, and minimize SW – see Eq. 7. 
 
SB= ∑ (μc - x̅)(μc - x̅)
T
 c         (Eq.6) 
SW= ∑ ∑ (xi - μc)(xi - μc)
T
 i ∈ cc      (Eq.7) 
 
𝜇𝑐 is the mean value of class Ci samples, and is given by Eq.8. 
μ
c
= 
1
ni
 ∑ xx∈ Ci          (Eq.8) 
 
Since the ratio J in Eq.9 is within the range of SB and SW, it 
can be easily maximized as an optimization problem using the 
projection matrix Wr (see Eq.9). 
J = 
Wr
TSB Wr
Wr
TSW Wr
          (Eq.9) 
 
All these operations will be conducted on the training dataset 
(see Section IV) to obtain an ideal transformation matrix that 
can be applied to future test sets or unknown instances. 
 
Table 1. Transformed Features Dependency Of Train+ Data Set After 
Applying Two Level Of Reduction Due To Correlation Coefficient Measure.   
features LDA1 LDA2 LDA3 LDA4 
LDA1 1 -3.76E-17 4.73E-16 1.06E-16 
LDA2 -3.76E-17 1 -6.69E-17 -3.52E-16 
LDA3 4.73E-16 -6.69E-17 1 -1.65E-15 
LDA4 1.06E-16 -3.52E-16 -1.65E-15 1 
 
Fig 3. Imbedded Error Function measure of NSL-KDD train data set to select optimum number of dimension with minimum error and 
information loss. 
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Fig 4. Two-dimensions of new mapped dataset processed by dimension reduction module 
 
Table 2. Transformed Features Dependency Of Train_20%  Data Set After 
Applying Two Level Of Reduction Due To Correlation Coefficient Measure.   
features LDA1 LDA2 LDA3 LDA4 
LDA1 1 -8.37E-17 -4.20E-17 2.49E-16 
LDA2 -8.37E-17 1 -1.89E-16 -4.88E-16 
LDA3 -4.20E-17 -1.89E-16 1 4.81E-16 
LDA4 2.49E-16 -4.88E-16 4.81E-16 1 
 
C. Classification Module 
At this stage, TDTC is already trained using the transformed 
dataset and classified incoming traffic utilizing a multilayer 
classifier (introduced in [31]) to detect anomalies. The choice 
of the classifier is due to its capability in detecting abnormal 
behaviors due to the use of: 
 Two embedded classifiers for assigning exact class 
labels; 
 Simple classifier techniques such Naïve Bayes [47] and 
K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN); 
 Good similarity measure for rare instances to handle 
imbalanced datasets; and 
 Bucketing technique to speed up classification tasks. 
Figure 6 illustrates how classification modules are applied on 
incoming labeled instances. The Naïve Bayes classifier is used 
to classify anomalous behavior, which is then refined to 
normal instances using the Certainty-Factor version of K-
Nearest Neighbor (CF-KNN).  Naïve Bayes is an efficient 
classification method since it presumes independence of all 
features of each sample in the given class-label (conditional 
independence assumption).  
The transformed features are assessed using correlation 
coefficient parameter. This measure [48] shows the relation 
between variables (features) by giving a number in the [-1, 1] 
interval, where 1 indicates a positive linear correlation, 0 no 
linear correlation, and −1 a negative linear correlation. The 
Correlation Coefficient assessments of the final features shows 
that the transferred features at two layers of dimension 
reduction module are mostly independent, since ρ=0.   
This measure indicates that there is no strict dependency 
among the classifier input features – see also Tables 1 and 2. 
The figures dependency among the features also significantly 
decreases, in comparison to the findings reported in [31]. The 
certainty-factor similarity measure in the classification module 
is based on the distribution proportion of classes in the 
training dataset to resolve imbalance data set issue. Certainty-
Factor (CF) is a number that lies in [-1, 1] interval and 
specifies the amount of certainty for a given incoming sample 
[49]. 
CF measure is included in the KNN [50] classification 
module:  
 Let N (S, k) be k closest adjacent of S; 
 P (C= ci |D) be the ratio of ci in training set D; and 
 P (C= ci |N (S, k)) be the ratio of ci in the query 
result. 
Now, CF measure can be computed using Eq. 10 and Eq. 11: 
 
if (p(C= ci |N (S, k)) ≥ p(C= ci |D)) 
 
CF(C= ci, N(S, k)) = 
p(C=ci | N(S, k))  - p(C= ci |D) 
1- p(C= ci |D)
     (Eq.10) 
Else 
CF(C= ci, N(S, k)) = 
p(C=ci | N(S, k))  - p(C= ci  |D) 
 p(C= ci |D)
     (Eq.11) 
 
The values of CF(C= ci, N (Q, k)) are in the range of [-1, 1]. 
The CF strategy for KNN classification is defined as: 
SCF = argmax {CF(C= ci, N(Q, k))}        (Eq.12) 
 
At this tier, KNN classifier uses a bucketing technique called 
K-d tree [51] to accelerate the nearest neighbor searching 
process of KNN. 
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TABLE 3. NSL-KDD  DATA SET CLASSES DISTRIBUTION 
Datasets Total 
Records 
Normal Probe DoS U2R R2L 
Train_20% 25192 13449 2289 9234 11 209 
Train+ 125973 67343 11656 45927 52 995 
Test+ 22544 9711 2421 7458 67 2887 
 
IV. EXPERIMENT SETUP 
A. NSL-KDD 
In the NSL-KDD dataset, flaws reported in the original 
KDD99 dataset [52] were removed. Although there are still 
known issues in the NSL-KDD dataset [53], this does not 
affect the application of the dataset in this research or the 
validity of the findings. Each NSL-KDD record consists of a 
network connection with 41 defined attributes (e.g. protocol 
type, service and flag), which are labeled as normal or one of 
the 24 type of attack classes (e.g. Probe, DoS, U2R and R2L). 
NSL-KDD has two training sets and one test set with different 
distribution – see Table 1. Since the test set contains 17 new 
attack types not included in the training set, we can evaluate 
the effectiveness of TCTD in detecting unknown or 
uncommon attacks. 
B. Data transformation 
Before the dataset is applied, each feature vector is normalized 
to a positive integer value within the range of [1,100] in order 
to improve the performance of the classifier and dimension 
reduction module. 
Each nominal feature value is specified with a unique 
integer number (e.g. TCP = 1, UDP = 2, ICMP = 3). The result 
value of each feature is mapped into an integer number, to 
avoid any bias, as shown in Eq.13 for each continuous-
valued 𝑧. Continuous-valued features is normalized using 
logarithm to base 2 and then casting into an integer value. 
 
if (z  > 2) z = ∫ ( log2(z) +1)           (Eq.13) 
C. Performance indicators 
The four common performance indicators for the intrusion 
detection systems are as follows [54]:   
 True Positive (TP): indicates that benign behavior is 
correctly predicted as benign; 
 True Negative (TN): indicates that malicious 
behavior is correctly detected; 
 False Positive (FP): indicates that malicious behavior 
is identified as benign; and 
 False Negative (FN): indicates that benign behavior 
is wrongly detected as malicious.  
The Detection Rate (DR) is a measure of the classifier 
correctly detecting malicious samples of all malicious objects, 
and is computed as: DR = 
TP
 FN+TP
.  
The False Alarm Rate is a measure of the classifier wrongly 
detecting benign samples as malicious of all benign objects, 
and is computed as:  FAR   = 
FP
FP + TN
 
V. FINDINGS 
The experiment was conducted using MATLAB R2015a 
running on a personal computer (PC) powered by AMD 
Phenom II X6 3.8GHz and 12 GB RAM. TDTC is trained 
with both training sets and then evaluated using the test set 
(Test+). TDTC’s classification module is adopted from [31], 
with the same the parameter setting. Thus, k = 3 was used for 
CF-KNN classifier. 
Figure 7 shows the mapped test dataset into new feature 
space, after applying the dimension reduction module. TDTC 
only uses two features of new mapped data (instead of all four 
features of lda1 to lda4, based on detection rates) – see Figure 
8. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 NSL-KDD Data Set Attacks Label Taxonomy And Their Existence In Train And Test Set Respectively. 
Main Class Sub Class (Attacks) in Train set New Subclass (Attacks) in Test set 
DoS back, land, neptune, pod, smurf, teardrop Apache2, Mailbomb, Processtable 
Probe ftp write, guess passwd, imap, multhop, phf, 
spy, warezclient, warezmaster 
Mscan, Saint 
User-to-Root (U2R) Buffer overflow, perl, loadmodule, rootkit. Httptunnel, Ps, Sqlattack, Xterm 
Remote-to-Local (R2L) ipsweep, nmap, portsweep, satan Sendmail, Named, Snmpgetattack, Snmpguess, 
Xlock, Xsnoop, Worm 
 
FIG. 6. APPLIED CLASSIFICATION MODULE IN TDTC 
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In addition, TDTC has an improved performance in detecting 
U2R and R2L attacks as shown in Table 5, as well as 
achieving a higher detection rate against probe attacks. The 
detection rate for DoS attacks in TDTC is also better than the 
two-tier model proposed in [16] and [55]. False alarm rate 
shows a reduction to 5.56% from 6.3% reported in [55]. 
A. Computation complexity  
In TDTC, the complexity overhead was reduced to half since 
only 35 out of 41 data set features were used. TDTC two 
dimension reduction module performance is an offline task, 
which is applied once to obtain the transform vectors for 
incoming samples. 
The first dimension reduction module is completely 
unsupervised while the generated class labels were added to 
the training dataset for another transformation based on the 
(supervised) LDA technique. The two-tier classification 
module (defined in [31]) embedded into TDTC reduces the 
computational complexity.  
The computational complexity of Naïve Bayes classifier of 
the classification module is determined as 𝑂(𝑒 × 𝑓), where e 
is the count of samples in dataset and f represents number of 
features. Therefore at this level, due to LDA optimum 
transformation, the first classifier of TDTC is equipped with 
only four features instead of 35. Thus, the computation 
overhead decreases by approximately ten times. In the second 
tier of classifier where KNN classifier was implemented, 
TDTC maintains only two attributes of the training dataset 
with the highest detection rate, as shown in Fig 8. Therefore, 
KNN consumes less memory space than the original dataset. 
In addition KNN classifier is equipped with k-d tree [51] for 
searching nearest samples. K-d tree is a data structure which 
keeps the data sample based on their distances; thus, this 
technique helps KNN to search faster than using the traditional 
approach.  
According to the second tier of classifier, searching nearest 
samples will take O(log n) time on average. 
 
FIG 7. TWO-DIMENSIONS OF TRANSFORMED TEST SET WITH OBTAINED PROJECTION MATRIX 
 
 
Fig 8. TDTC KNN classifier feature evaluation
B. Real-world Applications  
Since TDTC has a higher performance yet relatively lower 
resource requirements, it can be deployed to detect intrusion 
attempts in IoT backbone networks and their infrastructure 
services. TDTC also can be deployed as an auxiliary service 
for digital forensics in IoT ecosystem, such as those discussed 
in [56] to detect residual attack patterns of IoT network layer. 
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
Due to the increases in low frequency, low profile IoT-
based attacks [39], TDTC capabilities in detection of U2R and 
R2L attacks are useful in incident detection and handling.  
 
TABLE 5. A COMPARATIVE SUMMARY 
 
Method Normal Probe DoS U2R R2L 
TDTC 94.43 87.32 88.20 70.15 42 
Two-tier[31] 94.56 79.76 84.68 67.16 34.81 
SVM with 
BIRCH [29] 
99.3 99.5 97.5 28.8 19.7 
ESC-IDS[28] 98.2 99.5 84.1 31.5 14.1 
Association 
rule IDS [57] 
99.5 96.8 74.9 0.79 0.38 
HFR-MLR 
Method [55] 
93.70 80.2 89.70 29.50 34.20 
 
TABLE 6. TWO CLASSES CLASSIFICATION COMPARISON RESULT IN PERCENT 
USING TRAIN_20% AND TEST+  
 
Method Train set Detection 
Rate 
False Alarm 
Rate 
TDTC Train_20% 84.82 5.56 
Two-tier [31] Train_20% 83.24 4.83 
Naïve Bayes [9] Train_20% 76.56 N/A 
Random forest [9] Train_20% 80.67 N/A 
SVM [9] Train_20% 69.52 N/A 
Decision trees (J48) [9] Train_20% 81.05 N/A 
TABLE 7. BINARY CLASSIFICATION COMPARISON RESULT IN PERCENT USING 
TRAIN
+ 
AND TEST
+ 
 
Method Train set Detection 
Rate 
False Alarm 
Rate 
TDTC Train+ 84.86 4.86 
Two-tier [31] Train+ 81.97 5.44 
SOM IDS [58] Train+ 75.49 N/A 
Fuzzy Classification 
by Evolutionary 
Algorithms [59] 
Train+ 82.74 3.92 
Feature selection 
with SVM IDS [26] 
Train+ 82 15 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
With the widespread adoption of IoT devices and services in 
our data-centric and Internet-connected societies, ensuring the 
security of IoT infrastructure is important to ensure a secure 
and stable society. A successful attack on the IoT 
infrastructure can have crippling effects. For example, 
compromise of IoT services in smart cities could easily lead to 
a major chaos or even life threatening situations (see [58], 
[59], [60]).  
In this paper, a model with two-layer dimension reduction 
and classification was proposed. This model is designed to 
detect intrusive activities in IoT backbone networks, 
particularly in detecting low frequency attacks (e.g. U2R and 
R2L) that could have potentially damaging consequences. Our 
proposed model outperformed existing similar models in terms 
of detection rate for both low frequency and common attacks. 
Since TDTC uses both unsupervised (PCA) and supervised 
(LDA) feature extraction methods, we were able to accurately 
distinguish between different attack types and normal 
behaviors, thanks to utilized classification algorithms.  
Future research includes exploring the potential of non-
parametric methods such as dimension reduction module and 
fuzzy clustering to achieve a better classification against U2R, 
R2L and other attacks. Another interesting future work could 
be extension of the proposed model to detect intrusions at 
other layers of the IoT architecture such as application and 
support layers, as well as other protocols running in the 
network layer. 
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